Promotion Incentives in the Public Sector: Evidence from Chinese Schools

Arbeitspapier

We provide evidence that promotion incentives influence the effort of public employees by studying China's system of promotions for teachers. Predictions from a tournament model of promotion are tested using retrospective panel data on primary and middle school teachers. Consistent with theory, high wage increases for promotion are associated with better performance, teachers increase effort in years leading up to promotion eligibility, and reduce effort if they are repeatedly passed over for promotion. Evaluation scores are positively associated with teacher time use and with student test scores, diminishing concerns that evaluations are manipulated.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 10547

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials ; Compensation Packages; Payment Methods ; Public Sector Labor Markets ; Personnel Economics: Firm Employment Decisions; Promotions
• Subject: teacher incentives ; promotions ; China

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Karachiwalla, Naureen ; Park, Albert
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
• (where): Bonn
• (when): 2017

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/161170
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET