Arbeitspapier
Incentives to Work and Performance in the Public Sector
This paper develops a dynamic general equilibrium model with three distinct social groups, capitalists, private workers and public employees. After solving for the status quo equilibrium, which can mimic the advantages of employment in the public sector in most EU countries, the paper looks for policy reforms that can improve work incentives, and hence enhance productive efficiency, in the public sector. We focus on reforms aiming to establish parity between work conditions in the public and the private sector.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 5193
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Computable and Other Applied General Equilibrium Models
- Thema
-
dynamic general equilibrium models
efficiency
equity
employment
incentives
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Economides, George
Philippopoulos, Apostolis
Varthalitis, Petros
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2015
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Economides, George
- Philippopoulos, Apostolis
- Varthalitis, Petros
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2015
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