Arbeitspapier
The costs of favoritism: is politically-driven aid less effective?
As is now well documented, aid is given for both political as well as economic reasons. The conventional wisdom is that politically-motivated aid is less effective in promoting developmental objectives. We examine the ex-post performance ratings of World Bank projects and generally find that projects that are potentially politically motivated - such as those granted to governments holding a non-permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council or an Executive Directorship at the World Bank - are no more likely, on average, to get a negative quality rating than other projects. When aid is given to Security Council members with higher short-term debt, however, a negative quality rating is more likely. So we find evidence that World Bank project quality suffers as a consequence of political influence only when the recipient country is economically vulnerable in the first place.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 4820
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
International Linkages to Development; Role of International Organizations
Macroeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
Foreign Aid
- Thema
-
World Bank
aid effectiveness
political influence
United Nations Security Council
Entwicklungshilfe
Entwicklungsfinanzierung
Entwicklungsprojekt
Projektbewertung
Public Choice
Internationale Organisation
Internationale Sicherheit
Mitgliedschaft
Auslandsverschuldung
Welt
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Dreher, Axel
Klasen, Stephan
Vreeland, James Raymond
Werker, Eric
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
- (wo)
-
Bonn
- (wann)
-
2010
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ
Datenpartner
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Dreher, Axel
- Klasen, Stephan
- Vreeland, James Raymond
- Werker, Eric
- Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
Entstanden
- 2010
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