The costs of favoritism: Is politically-driven aid less effective?

Arbeitspapier

As is now well documented, aid is given for both political as well as economic reasons. The conventional wisdom is that politically-motivated aid is less effective in promoting developmental objectives. We examine the ex-post performance ratings of World Bank projects and generally find that projects that are potentially politically motivated - such as those granted to governments holding a non-permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council or an Executive Directorship at the World Bank - are no more likely, on average, to get a negative quality rating than other projects. When aid is given to Security Council members with higher short-term debt, however, a negative quality rating is more likely. So we find evidence that World Bank project quality suffers as a consequence of political influence only when the recipient country is economically vulnerable in the first place.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: cege Discussion Papers ; No. 97

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; International Linkages to Development; Role of International Organizations ; Macroeconomic Analyses of Economic Development ; Foreign Aid
• Subject: World Bank ; Aid Effectiveness ; Political Influence ; United Nations Security Council ; Entwicklungshilfe ; Entwicklungsfinanzierung ; Entwicklungsprojekt ; Projektbewertung ; Public Choice ; Internationale Organisation ; Internationale Sicherheit ; Mitgliedschaft ; Auslandsverschuldung ; Welt

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Dreher, Axel ; Klasen, Stephan ; Raymond, James ; Werker, Eric
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): University of Göttingen, Center for European, Governance and Economic Development Research (cege)
• (where): Göttingen
• (when): 2010

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/41567
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET