Transfer in a conflict model as a reason for (unconditional) basic income

Abstract: In the discussion about a universal basic income, the dimension of conditionality comes up frequently in the context of work requirements for social security policies. In these exchanges one aspect that comes up frequently is the costs of a universal social policy. In this article we apply a conflict model to the case of a basic income that suggests incentives for a government to pay a transfer to reduce and prevent conflict. These incentives justify the costs of the transfer program. However, the property that reduces conflict potential is the conditionality to lay down your arms. We discuss the condition of obeying the law to establish peace and a functioning economy. We argue that this conditionality is inherent to any form of societal participation and is a prerequisite for any social policy. Thus, it does not reject unconditional programs. Further, we discuss ways in which the constitutional perspective and the New Ordoliberalism may justify such conditionality.

The papers of the FRIBIS Discussion Paper Series are working papers that do not undergo a peer-review process by FRIBIS. The authors are responsible for the content

Location
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
Extent
Online-Ressource
Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
FRIBIS Discussion Paper Series ; 2022/3

Classification
Wirtschaft

Event
Veröffentlichung
(where)
Freiburg
(who)
Universität
(when)
2023
Creator
Contributor

DOI
10.6094/FRIBIS/DiscussionPaper/7/03-2022
URN
urn:nbn:de:bsz:25-freidok-2372550
Rights
Open Access; Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
Last update
25.03.2025, 1:50 PM CET

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Associated

Time of origin

  • 2023

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