Complementarities in Corporate Governance - A Survey of the Literature with Special Emphasis on Japan

Arbeitspapier

The present paper uses a comparison of Japan and the US to argue that the debate about corporate governance reform is best framed in terms of systems of complementary instruments and institutions. It argues that the Japanese and US systems of corporate governance differ along many dimensions, yet can both be understood as efficient combinations of complementary instruments adapted to a particular institutional and regulatory environment. The paper also shows how exogenous shocks and piecemeal regulatory reforms have undermined the internal consistency of the Japanese system in the recent past.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Kiel Working Paper ; No. 947

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights ; Corporate Finance and Governance: General
• Subject: Corporate governance ; Complementarity ; Agency problem ; Japan ; Corporate Governance ; Gesellschaftsrecht ; Agency Theory ; Institutionalismus ; Unternehmensentwicklung ; Vergleich ; Japan ; Vereinigte Staaten

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Heinrich, Ralph P.
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Kiel Institute of World Economics (IfW)
• (where): Kiel
• (when): 1999

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/17795
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET