Konferenzbeitrag

The Impact of Fake Reviews on Reputation Systems and Efficiency

Online interactions are frequently governed by reputation systems that allow users to evaluate each other after an interaction. Effective reputation systems can increase trust and may improve efficiency in market settings. In recent years, however, fake reviews have become increasingly prevalent. Since it is difficult to clearly identify fake reviews in field studies, we design a lab10 oratory experiment. Using a repeated public good game with a reputation system, we study (i) how feedback manipulation influences the reliability of average ratings and (ii) whether the existence of manipulated ratings reduces efficiency. We find that feedback manipulation generally decreases the reliability of average ratings in comparison to a control treatment where cheating is not possible. When manipulation is possible and free, average ratings become less 15 reliable, expectations are lower and both cooperation and efficiency are significantly reduced. When there are costs of manipulation, however, average ratings are more reliable and contributions and efficiency are not impaired. Interestingly, this is the case even when costs of manipulation are comparatively low.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2021: Climate Economics

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation; Networks
Thema
Reputation Systems
Fake Reviews
Reliability of Ratings
Efficiency

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Krügel, Jan Philipp
Paetzel, Fabian
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
(wo)
Kiel, Hamburg
(wann)
2021

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Konferenzbeitrag

Beteiligte

  • Krügel, Jan Philipp
  • Paetzel, Fabian
  • ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics

Entstanden

  • 2021

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