Arbeitspapier

Flexible integration

For a club such as the European Union, an important question is when, and under which conditions, a subset of the members should be allowed to form inner clubs and enhance cooperation. Flexible cooperation allows members to participate if and only if they benefit, but it generates a freerider problem if potential members choose to opt out. The analysis shows that flexible cooperation is better if the heterogeneity is large and the externality small. The best possible symmetric and monotonic participation mechanism, however, is implemented by two thresholds: A mandatory and a minimum participation rule. Rigid and flexible cooperation are both special cases of this mechanism. For each of these thresholds, the optimum is characterized.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 1428

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Thema
Europäische Integration
Kooperation
EU-Beitrittskriterien
Klubtheorie
Trittbrettfahrerverhalten
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Harstad, Bård
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
(wo)
Evanston, IL
(wann)
2006

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Harstad, Bård
  • Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science

Entstanden

  • 2006

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