Arbeitspapier
Optimal tax policy and wage subsidy in an imperfectly competitive economy
In an imperfectly competitive economy with direct and indirect taxes, the first best wage subsidy overcompensates workers and provides the incentive to misreport working hours. We show that in the second best optimum where the government cannot use a wage subsidy, the optimal policy is to tax labour income at a zero rate. This policy is optimal because it minimizes the incentive to misreport working hours.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Cardiff Economics Working Papers ; No. E2010/15
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Monopoly
Fiscal Policy
Taxation and Subsidies: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents: General
- Thema
-
Optimal Taxation
Ramsey Problem
Wage Subsidy
Optimale Besteuerung
Lohnsubvention
Unvollkommener Wettbewerb
Ramsey-Preis
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Selim, Sheikh
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School
- (wo)
-
Cardiff
- (wann)
-
2010
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Selim, Sheikh
- Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School
Entstanden
- 2010