Arbeitspapier

Strict Incentives and Strategic Uncertainty

This paper proposes a comprehensive perspective on the question of self-enforcing solutions for normal form games. While this question has been widely discussed in the literature, the focus is usually either on strict incentives for players to stay within the proposed solution or on strategic uncertainty, i.e. robustness to trembles. The present approach combines both requirements in proposing the concept of robust sets, i.e. sets of strategy profiles which satisfy both strict incentives and robustness to strategic uncertainty. The result is a set valued solution, a variant of which is shown to exist for all finite normal form games.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 7715

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Thema
game theory
self-enforcing solution
strict incentives
strategic uncertainty

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Carlsson, Hans
Wichardt, Philipp Christoph
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2019

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Carlsson, Hans
  • Wichardt, Philipp Christoph
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2019

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