Arbeitspapier
Strict Incentives and Strategic Uncertainty
This paper proposes a comprehensive perspective on the question of self-enforcing solutions for normal form games. While this question has been widely discussed in the literature, the focus is usually either on strict incentives for players to stay within the proposed solution or on strategic uncertainty, i.e. robustness to trembles. The present approach combines both requirements in proposing the concept of robust sets, i.e. sets of strategy profiles which satisfy both strict incentives and robustness to strategic uncertainty. The result is a set valued solution, a variant of which is shown to exist for all finite normal form games.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 7715
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
- Thema
-
game theory
self-enforcing solution
strict incentives
strategic uncertainty
- Ereignis
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Carlsson, Hans
Wichardt, Philipp Christoph
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
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Munich
- (wann)
-
2019
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Carlsson, Hans
- Wichardt, Philipp Christoph
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2019