Suspicious Success - Cheating, Inequality Acceptance, and Political Preferences

Arbeitspapier

Supporters of left-wing parties typically place more emphasis on redistributive policies than right-wing voters. I investigate whether this difference in tolerating inequality is amplified by suspicious success - achievements that may arise from cheating. Using a laboratory experiment, I exogenously vary cheating opportunities for stakeholders who work on a real effort task and earn money according to their self-reported performances. An impartial spectator is able to redistribute the earnings between the stakeholders, although it is not possible to detect cheating. I find that the opportunity to cheat leads to different views on whether to accept inequality. Left-wing spectators substantially reduce inequality when cheating is possible, while the treatment has no significant effect on choices of right-wing spectators. Since neither differences in beliefs nor differences in norms about cheating can explain this finding, it seems to be driven by a difference in preferences. These results suggest that redistributive preferences will diverge even more once public awareness increases that inequality may be to a certain extent created by cheating.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 82

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual ; Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement ; Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness ; Taxation and Subsidies: Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies ; Tax Evasion and Avoidance
• Subject: cheating ; inequality ; fairness ; political preferences ; redistribution

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Klimm, Felix
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München und Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190 - Rationality and Competition
• (where): München und Berlin
• (when): 2018

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/185752
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET