Research among Copycats: R&D, Spillovers, and Feedback Strategies

Arbeitspapier

We study a stochastic dynamic game of process innovation in which firms can initiate and terminate R&D efforts and production at different times. We discern the impact of knowledge spillovers on the investments in existing markets, as well as on the likely structure of newly forming markets, for all possible asymmetries between firms. We show that the relation between spillovers, R&D efforts, and surpluses is non-monotonic and dependent on both the relative and absolute efficiency of firms. Larger spillovers increase the likelihood that a new technology is brought to production, but they do not necessarily make the industry more competitive.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 14-112/II

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis ; Computational Techniques; Simulation Modeling ; Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games ; Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
• Subject: Differential game ; Feedback Nash equilibrium ; Numerical partial differential equations ; R&D ; Spillovers

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Smrkolj, Grega ; Wagener, Florian
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Tinbergen Institute
• (where): Amsterdam and Rotterdam
• (when): 2014

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/107822
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET