Arbeitspapier
R&D spillovers throught RJV cooperation
We investigate the dimensions through which R&D spillovers are propagated across firms via cooperation through Research Joint Ventures (RJVs). We build on the framework developed by Bloom et al. (2013) which considers the opposing effects of technology spillovers and product market rivalry, and extend it to account for RJVs. Our main findings are that the adverse effects of product market rivalry are mitigated if firms cooperate in RJVs and that R&D spending is reduced among technologically close RJV participants.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: DIW Discussion Papers ; No. 1887
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Contracting Out; Joint Ventures; Technology Licensing
Antitrust Policy and Public Enterprises, Nonprofit Institutions, and Professional Organizations
Antitrust Law
Management of Technological Innovation and R&D
- Thema
-
spillovers
R&D
research joint ventures
market value
patents
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Banal-Estañol, Albert
Duso, Tomaso
Seldeslachts, Jo
Szücs, Florian
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW)
- (wo)
-
Berlin
- (wann)
-
2020
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Banal-Estañol, Albert
- Duso, Tomaso
- Seldeslachts, Jo
- Szücs, Florian
- Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW)
Entstanden
- 2020
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