Arbeitspapier
Central bank independence and conservatism under uncertainty: Substitutes or complements?
This paper revisits the trade-off between central bank independence and conservatism using a New Keynesian model with uncertainty about the central banker's output gap target. It is shown that when this uncertainty is high, the trade-off no longer holds. In this case, the optimal combination between independence and conservatism is characterised by complementarity.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge ; No. 140-10
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Monetary Policy
Central Banks and Their Policies
- Thema
-
central bank independence
conservatism
transparency of monetary policy
Geldpolitik
Regelgebundene Politik
Zentralbankautonomie
Entscheidung bei Unsicherheit
Staatliche Information
Ungleichgewichtstheorie
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Hefeker, Carsten
Zimmer, Blandine
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Universität Siegen, Fakultät III, Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Wirtschaftsinformatik und Wirtschaftsrecht
- (wo)
-
Siegen
- (wann)
-
2010
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Hefeker, Carsten
- Zimmer, Blandine
- Universität Siegen, Fakultät III, Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Wirtschaftsinformatik und Wirtschaftsrecht
Entstanden
- 2010
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