Arbeitspapier

The Two-Person Harvard Game: An Experimental Analysis

Two subjects have to repeatedly choose between two alternatives, A and B, where payoffs of an A or B-choice depend on the choices made by both players in a number of previous choices. Locally, alternative A gives always more payoff than alternative B. However, in terms of overall payoffs exclusive choice of B is a better strategy. The equilibrium predicted by the theory of melioration is to exclusively play A, while the Nash equilibrium is to almost exclusively play B. The predictive values of such equilibria are analyzed under three different informational conditions. Special attention is paid to the learning processes exhibited by players.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Bonn Econ Discussion Papers ; No. 23/2001

Classification
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Subject
Bounded rationality
Psychology
Melioration
Nash equilibrium
Information
Learning

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Apesteguia, Jose
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE)
(where)
Bonn
(when)
2001

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Apesteguia, Jose
  • University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE)

Time of origin

  • 2001

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