Arbeitspapier

Variance analysis and linear contracts in agencies with distorted performance measures

This paper investigates the role of variance analysis procedures in aligning objectives under the condition of distorted performance measurement. A riskneutral agency with linear contracts is analyzed, whereby the agent receives postcontract, pre-decision information on his productivity. If the performance measure is informative with respect to the agent's marginal product concerning the principal's objective, variance investigation can alleviate effort misallocation. These results carry over to a participative budgeting situation, but in this case the variance investigation procedures are less demanding.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper ; No. 206

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Budde, Jörg
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
(wo)
München
(wann)
2007

DOI
doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.13346
Handle
URN
urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-13346-1
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Budde, Jörg
  • Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)

Entstanden

  • 2007

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