Arbeitspapier
Affirmative action through extra prizes
Some affirmative action policies establish that a set of disadvantaged competitors has access to an extra prize. We analyse the effects of creating an extra prize by reducing the prize in the main competition. Contestants differ in ability and agents with relatively low ability belong to a disadvantaged minority. All contestants compete for the main prize, but only disadvantaged agents can win the extra prize. We show that an extra prize is a powerful tool to ensure participation of disadvantaged agents. Moreover, for intermediate levels of the disadvantage of the minority, introducing an extra prize increases total equilibrium effort compared to a standard contest. Thus, even a contest designer not interested in affirmative action might establish an extra prize in order to enhance competition.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: CeDEx Discussion Paper Series ; No. 2014-08
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty: Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
Labor Discrimination: Public Policy
- Thema
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asymmetric contest
equality of opportunity
affirmative action
discrimination
prize structure
exclusion principle
- Ereignis
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
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Dahm, Matthias
Esteve, Patricia
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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The University of Nottingham, Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics (CeDEx)
- (wo)
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Nottingham
- (wann)
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2014
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Dahm, Matthias
- Esteve, Patricia
- The University of Nottingham, Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics (CeDEx)
Entstanden
- 2014