Arbeitspapier

Affirmative action through endogenous set-asides

We study the effects of affirmative action through endogenous set-asides. We propose a share auction for dual sourcing in which more intensive affirmative action strengthens the favoured provider. This has the potential to level the playing field and induce more competitive procurement overall. Our main result provides a condition under which affirmative action not only guarantees very substantial minority representation, but also reduces the buyer's provision cost compared to a first-price auction. We also show that our main result is robust to variations of our benchmark model, including the assumptions specifying what providers know about each other, and how affirmative action programs are implemented.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CeDEx Discussion Paper Series ; No. 2020-01

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Auctions
Market Design
National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: Procurement
Economics of Minorities, Races, Indigenous Peoples, and Immigrants; Non-labor Discrimination
Thema
Affirmative Action
Bidding Credits
Bidding Preferences
Set-Asides

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Alcalde, José
Dahm, Matthias
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
The University of Nottingham, Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics (CeDEx)
(wo)
Nottingham
(wann)
2020

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
20.09.2024, 08:21 MESZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Alcalde, José
  • Dahm, Matthias
  • The University of Nottingham, Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics (CeDEx)

Entstanden

  • 2020

Ähnliche Objekte (12)