Traits, Imitation, and Evolutionary Dynamics

Arbeitspapier

In this article, a modelling framework for the information transmission between agents in an evolutionary game setting is proposed. Agents observe traits which reaect past and present behaviour and success of other agents. If agents imitate more successful agents based on these traits, the resulting dynamics are a multivariate stochastic process. An example for such a process is simulated. The results resemble the replicator dynamics to a remarkable degree. If traits moderately depend on the past, this accelerates convergence of the dynamics towards a stable state. If the dependence is strong, the stable state is not reached.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Bonn Econ Discussion Papers ; No. 15/2003

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games ; Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
• Subject: replicator dynamics ; imitation ; evolution of cooperation ; information transmission ; simulation ; Imitationswettbewerb ; Lernprozess ; Gefangenendilemma ; Evolutionäre Spieltheorie ; Theorie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Schnedler, Wendelin
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE)
• (where): Bonn
• (when): 2003

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/22864
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET