Politicians, Governed vs. Non-Governed Interest Groups and Rent Dissipation

Arbeitspapier

Government intervention often gives rise to contests and the government can influence their outcome by choosing their type. We consider a contest with two interest groups: one that is governed by a central planner and one that is not. Rent dissipation is compared under two well-known contest success functions: the generalized logit and the all-pay auction. We also consider the case in which the government can limit the size of the non-governed interest group in order to determine the scope of rent dissipation, with the goal of either increasing the rent obtained by the government or reducing the wasted resources invested in the contest.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 7736

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General ; Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations ; Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
• Subject: rent dissipation ; central planner ; contest ; all-pay auction ; generalized logit contest success function

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Epstein, Gil S. ; Mealem, Yosef
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
• (where): Bonn
• (when): 2013

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/89916
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET