Arbeitspapier

Employer's information and promotion-seeking activities

This paper presents a model in which promotion of employees within the internal firm hierarchy is determined by the individuals' allocation of time between promotion/rent-seeking and productive activity. We consider the effect of an increase in the employer's knowledge (information) regarding the employees' productivity levels on the total time spent by the workers in non-productive promotion-seeking activities.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 7023

Classification
Wirtschaft
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Subject
promotion-seeking activities
contest
knowledge
Karriereplanung
Rent Seeking
Arbeitskräfte
Zeitverwendung
Arbeitsproduktivität
Unternehmer
Information
Theorie

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Epstein, Gil S.
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
(where)
Bonn
(when)
2012

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET

Data provider

This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.

Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Epstein, Gil S.
  • Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Time of origin

  • 2012

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