Arbeitspapier
Employer's information and promotion-seeking activities
This paper presents a model in which promotion of employees within the internal firm hierarchy is determined by the individuals' allocation of time between promotion/rent-seeking and productive activity. We consider the effect of an increase in the employer's knowledge (information) regarding the employees' productivity levels on the total time spent by the workers in non-productive promotion-seeking activities.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 7023
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- Subject
-
promotion-seeking activities
contest
knowledge
Karriereplanung
Rent Seeking
Arbeitskräfte
Zeitverwendung
Arbeitsproduktivität
Unternehmer
Information
Theorie
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Epstein, Gil S.
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
- (where)
-
Bonn
- (when)
-
2012
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Epstein, Gil S.
- Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
Time of origin
- 2012