Arbeitspapier

Fiscal and Monetary Policy Coordination, Macroeconomic Stability, and Sovereign Risk

In standard macroeconomic models, debt sustainability and price level determinacy are achieved when fiscal policy avoids explosive debt and monetary policy controls inflation, irrespective of the relative strengths of each policy stance. We examine how these policy requirements for equilibrium stability and determinacy change in the presence of sovereign risk. An increase in sovereign risk reduces lender's willingness to hold government debt and raises consumption and inflation. Therefore, inflation and debt dynamics are determined jointly. To ensure stable macroeconomic conditions, both the fiscal and monetary stance must shift to offset debt sustainability concerns. We find that the adoption of a deficit target helps alleviate such concerns and raises the scope for macroeconomic stability.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 14-006/VI

Classification
Wirtschaft
Monetary Policy
Fiscal Policy
Comparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy; Stabilization; Treasury Policy
Subject
Fiscal and monetary policy coordination
equilibrium determinacy and stability
sovereign risk
policy rules

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Bonam, Dennis
Lukkezen, Jasper
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Tinbergen Institute
(where)
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
(when)
2014

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Bonam, Dennis
  • Lukkezen, Jasper
  • Tinbergen Institute

Time of origin

  • 2014

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