Konferenzbeitrag
A Theory of Autocratic Transition. Prerequisites to Self-Enforcing Democracy
This paper aims at contributing to a better understanding of the conditions of self-enforcing democracy by analyzing the recent wave of autocratic transitions. Based on a game-theoretic framework, we work out the conditions under which governments may induce the diverse public authorities to coordinate on extra-constitutional activities, eventually transforming the politico-institutional setting into one of autocratic rule. We find three empirically testable characteristics that promote this coordination process, namely: populism and public support, corruption, and a lack in the separation of powers. By contrast, low degrees of corruption and strongly separated powers can be viewed as prerequisites to self-enforcing democracy.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2018: Digitale Wirtschaft - Session: Institutions ; No. A17-V1
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
Other Economic Systems: Political Economy; Legal Institutions; Property Rights; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Regional Studies
- Subject
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self-enforcing democracy
political regimes
autocratic transition
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Apolte, Thomas
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
- (where)
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Kiel, Hamburg
- (when)
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2018
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Konferenzbeitrag
Associated
- Apolte, Thomas
- ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
Time of origin
- 2018
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Self-enforcing agreements on water allocation
Compliance Technology and Self-Enforcing Agreements
Self-enforcing agreements in international fisheries management
Self-enforcing voluntary agreements and environmental reputation