Arbeitspapier

Cooperation, competition, and welfare in a matching market

We investigate the welfare effect of increasing competition in an anonymous two-sided matching market, where matched pairs play an infinitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma. Higher matching efficiency is usually considered detrimental as it creates stronger incentives for defection. We point out, however, that a reduction in matching frictions also increases welfare because more agents find themselves in a cooperative relationship. We characterize the conditions for which increasing competition increases overall welfare. In particular, this is always the case when the incentives for defection are high.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 2022/6

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Thema
Cooperation
Prisoner's Dilemma
Competition
Welfare
Matching
Trust Building

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Bester, Helmut
Sákovics, József
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Freie Universität Berlin, School of Business & Economics
(wo)
Berlin
(wann)
2022

DOI
doi:10.17169/refubium-35308
Handle
URN
urn:nbn:de:kobv:188-refubium-35594-1
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Bester, Helmut
  • Sákovics, József
  • Freie Universität Berlin, School of Business & Economics

Entstanden

  • 2022

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