Fairness and competition in a bilateral matching market

Arbeitspapier

This paper analyzes fairness and bargaining in a dynamic bilateral matching market. Traders from both sides of the market are pairwise matched to share the gains from trade. The bargaining outcome depends on the traders' fairness attitudes. In equilibrium fairness matters because of market frictions. But, when these frictions become negligible, the equilibrium approaches theWalrasian competitive equilibrium, independently of the traders' inequity aversion. Fairness may yield a Pareto improvement; but also the contrary is possible. Overall, the market implications of fairness are very different from its effects in isolated bilateral bargaining.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 2021/11

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
• Thema: Fairness ; inequity aversion ; bargaining ; ultimatum game ; matching market ; search costs ; competitive equilibrium

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Bester, Helmut
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Freie Universität Berlin, School of Business & Economics
• (wo): Berlin
• (wann): 2021

Weitere Informationen

• DOI: doi:10.17169/refubium-30998
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/235647
• URN: urn:nbn:de:kobv:188-refubium-31262-4
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ