- Ausgabe
-
1. Aufl.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Umfang
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VIII, 83 S.
- Anmerkungen
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Zugl.: Mannheim, Univ., Diss., 2000
- ISBN
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978-3-89700-253-1
- Identifier
-
95883735X
- Reihe
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Akademische Abhandlungen zu den Wirtschaftswissenschaften
Thema
Forschungskooperation ; Vertikale Kooperation ; Risikokapital ; Wagnisfinanzierungsgesellschaft ; Kontrakttheorie ; Agency-Theorie ; Hochschulschrift
Beteiligte Personen und Organisationen
- Inhaltsverzeichnis
- Rechteinformation
-
Der Zugriff auf Teile des Objekts ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
16.08.2023, 18:38 MESZ
Objekttyp
- Monografie
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