Arbeitspapier
The Effects of Employment Protection on the Choice of Risky Projects
We consider a firm that is subject to employment protection laws that limit the firms ability to fire labor. In particular, we suppose that though a firm which shuts down can fire all its workers, it may fire no fewer. Compared to a firm that is subject to no employment protection, a firm constrained in firing will prefer a risk-free project over a risky one, but may prefer the riskier of two risky projects.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 689
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Thema
-
project choice
labor protection
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Glazer, Amihai
Kanniainen, Vesa
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2002
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Glazer, Amihai
- Kanniainen, Vesa
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2002