Arbeitspapier

Workplace democracy in the lab

While intuition suggests that empowering workers to have some say in the control of the firm is likely to have beneficial incentive effects, empirical evidence of such an effect is hard to come by because of numerous confounding factors in the naturally occurring data. We report evidence from a real-effort experiment confirming that worker performance is sensitive to the process used to select the compensation contract. Groups of workers that voted to determine their compensation scheme provided significantly more effort than groups that had no say in how they would be compensated. This effect is robust to controls for the compensation scheme implemented and worker characteristics (i.e., ability and gender).

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 5460

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
Producer Cooperatives; Labor Managed Firms; Employee Ownership
Thema
real-effort experiment
workplace democracy
decision control rights
Arbeitsleistung
Leistungsmotivation
Vergütungssystem
Mitbestimmung
Kooperative Führung

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Mellizo, Philip
Carpenter, Jeffrey P.
Matthews, Peter Hans
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
(wo)
Bonn
(wann)
2011

Handle
URN
urn:nbn:de:101:1-201104113333
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Mellizo, Philip
  • Carpenter, Jeffrey P.
  • Matthews, Peter Hans
  • Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Entstanden

  • 2011

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