Tolling the Bell for "Too-Big-to-Fail"? – A Comparison Between Four Special Bank Resolution Regimes

Artikel

In many countries, legislators have introduced special bank resolution regimes in order to handle the "too-big-to-fail"-(TBTF)-problem. Bank resolution schemes allow supervisors to restructure or liquidate an ailing bank, even without the consent of the bank owners. We identify key elements of bank resolution schemes and consider how they are implemented in Japan, the US, the Euro area, and in the UK. We compare the bank resolution regimes in these countries and evaluate whether they comply with the "Key Attributes" proposed by the Financial Stability Board. We also ask whether they are effective in addressing the TBTF-problem and promoting financial stability.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Journal: Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital ; ISSN: 2199-1235 ; Volume: 50 ; Year: 2017 ; Issue: 4 ; Pages: 509-543

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Corporate Finance and Governance: Government Policy and Regulation ; Financial Crises ; Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
• Thema: Bank resolution ; too-big-to-fail ; statutory bail-in ; bank levy ; resolution fund ; single-point-of-entry ; multiple-point-of-entry

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Iwasa, Yoichi ; Vollmer, Uwe
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Duncker & Humblot
• (wo): Berlin
• (wann): 2017

Weitere Informationen

• DOI: doi:10.3790/ccm.50.4.509
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ