Arbeitspapier
Resolving "too big to fail"
Using a synthetic control research design, we find that "living will" regulation increases a bank's annual cost of capital by 22 basis points, or 10 percent of total funding costs. This effect is stronger in banks that were measured as systemically important before the regulation's announcement. We interpret our findings as a reduction in "too big to fail" subsidies. The size of this effect is large: a back-of-the-envelope calculation implies a subsidy reduction of $42 billion annually. The impact on equity costs drives the main effect. The impact on deposit costs is statistically indistinguishable from zero, representing a good placebo test for our empirical strategy.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Staff Report ; No. 859
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation
- Thema
-
cost of capital
time consistency
too big to fail
resolution plans
Dodd-Frank
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Cetorelli, Nicola
Traina, James
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Federal Reserve Bank of New York
- (wo)
-
New York, NY
- (wann)
-
2018
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Cetorelli, Nicola
- Traina, James
- Federal Reserve Bank of New York
Entstanden
- 2018
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