Arbeitspapier

Markets and transaction costs

Transaction costs are omnipresent in markets yet are often omitted in economic models. We show that their presence can fundamentally alter incentives and welfare in markets in which the price equates supply and demand. We categorize transaction costs into two types. Asymptotically uninfluenceable transaction costs-such as fixed and price fees-preserve the key asymptotic properties of markets without transaction costs, namely strategyproofness, efficiency, and robustness to misspecified beliefs and to aggregate uncertainty. In contrast, influenceable transaction costs - such as spread fees - lead to complex strategic behavior (which we call price guessing) and may result in severe market failure. In our analysis of optimal design we focus on transaction costs that are fees collected by a platform as revenue. We show how optimal design depends on the traders' beliefs. In particular, with common prior beliefs, any asymptotically uninfluenceable fee schedule can be scaled to be optimal, while purely influenceable fee schedules lead to zero revenue. Our insights extend beyond markets equalizing demand and supply.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Working Paper ; No. 405

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Auctions
Market Design
Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Thema
Transaction Costs
Markets
Demand and Supply
Incentives
Efficiency
Robustness

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Jantschgi, Simon
Nax, Heinrich H.
Pradelski, Bary S. R.
Pycia, Marek
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
University of Zurich, Department of Economics
(wo)
Zurich
(wann)
2022

DOI
doi:10.5167/uzh-217044
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Jantschgi, Simon
  • Nax, Heinrich H.
  • Pradelski, Bary S. R.
  • Pycia, Marek
  • University of Zurich, Department of Economics

Entstanden

  • 2022

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