Arbeitspapier
Corporate espionage
We consider a multimarket framework where a set of firms compete on two interrelated oligopolistic markets. Prior to competing in these markets, firms can spy on others in order to increase the quality of their product. We characterize the equilibrium espionage networks and networks that maximize social welfare under the most interesting scenario of diseconomies of scope. We find that in some situations firms may refrain from spying even if it is costless. Moreover, even though spying leads to increased product quality, there exist situations where it is detrimental to both consumer welfare and social welfare.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: DIW Discussion Papers ; No. 854
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior: General
- Thema
-
Oligopoly
multimarket
networks
Industriespionage
Oligopol
Business Network
Konsumentenrente
Wohlfahrtseffekt
Lieferanten-Kunden-Beziehung
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Billand, Pascal
Bravard, Christophe
Chakrabarti, Subhadip
Sarangi, Sudipta
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW)
- (wo)
-
Berlin
- (wann)
-
2009
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:46 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Billand, Pascal
- Bravard, Christophe
- Chakrabarti, Subhadip
- Sarangi, Sudipta
- Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW)
Entstanden
- 2009