Arbeitspapier

Corporate espionage

We consider a multimarket framework where a set of firms compete on two interrelated oligopolistic markets. Prior to competing in these markets, firms can spy on others in order to increase the quality of their product. We characterize the equilibrium espionage networks and networks that maximize social welfare under the most interesting scenario of diseconomies of scope. We find that in some situations firms may refrain from spying even if it is costless. Moreover, even though spying leads to increased product quality, there exist situations where it is detrimental to both consumer welfare and social welfare.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: DIW Discussion Papers ; No. 854

Classification
Wirtschaft
Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior: General
Subject
Oligopoly
multimarket
networks
Industriespionage
Oligopol
Business Network
Konsumentenrente
Wohlfahrtseffekt
Lieferanten-Kunden-Beziehung
Theorie

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Billand, Pascal
Bravard, Christophe
Chakrabarti, Subhadip
Sarangi, Sudipta
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW)
(where)
Berlin
(when)
2009

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:46 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Billand, Pascal
  • Bravard, Christophe
  • Chakrabarti, Subhadip
  • Sarangi, Sudipta
  • Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW)

Time of origin

  • 2009

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