Arbeitspapier

Endogenizing managerial delegation: A new result under Nash bargaining and network effects

We reconsider the endogenous choice of delegation to a manager by two down-stream firms in both a Cournot and a Bertrand vertical market with network effects. An upstream monopolist charges a two-part tariff for a crucial input. By applying the Nash solution in a centralized bargaining, we show that hiring a manager is never an equilibrium under Cournot, regardless of network effects, while it can be the equilibrium choice for firms competing à la Bertrand, depending on the interplay between the network externalities and the degree of product substitutability.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: EERI Research Paper Series ; No. 15/2019

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation; Networks
Business Objectives of the Firm
Thema
Nash bargaining
two-part tariff
strategic delegation
network externalities

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Scrimitore, Marcella
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Economics and Econometrics Research Institute (EERI)
(wo)
Brussels
(wann)
2019

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Scrimitore, Marcella
  • Economics and Econometrics Research Institute (EERI)

Entstanden

  • 2019

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