Endogenizing managerial delegation: A new result under Nash bargaining and network effects

Arbeitspapier

We reconsider the endogenous choice of delegation to a manager by two down-stream firms in both a Cournot and a Bertrand vertical market with network effects. An upstream monopolist charges a two-part tariff for a crucial input. By applying the Nash solution in a centralized bargaining, we show that hiring a manager is never an equilibrium under Cournot, regardless of network effects, while it can be the equilibrium choice for firms competing à la Bertrand, depending on the interplay between the network externalities and the degree of product substitutability.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: EERI Research Paper Series ; No. 15/2019

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation; Networks ; Business Objectives of the Firm
• Thema: Nash bargaining ; two-part tariff ; strategic delegation ; network externalities

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Scrimitore, Marcella
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Economics and Econometrics Research Institute (EERI)
• (wo): Brussels
• (wann): 2019

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/213550
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ