Arbeitspapier
What drives immigration amnesties?
We develop a general model of legal and illegal immigration to understand the basic tradeoffs faced by a government in the decision to implement an immigration amnesty in the presence of a selective immigration policy. We show that two channels play an important role: an amnesty is more likely the more restricted are the occupational opportunities of undocumented immigrants and the less redistributive is the welfare state. Empirical evidence based on a novel panel dataset of legalizations carried out by a group of OECD countries between 1980-2007 broadly supports the role played by the channels identified in our theoretical model.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 3981
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
International Migration
Geographic Labor Mobility; Immigrant Workers
- Thema
-
illegal immigration
amnesties
labor market mismatch
welfare state
Illegale Einwanderung
Straffreiheit
Migrationspolitik
Arbeitsmarktflexibilität
Sozialstaat
OECD-Staaten
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Casarico, Alessandra
Facchini, Giovanni
Frattini, Tommaso
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2012
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Casarico, Alessandra
- Facchini, Giovanni
- Frattini, Tommaso
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2012