Arbeitspapier

What drives immigration amnesties?

We develop a general model of legal and illegal immigration to understand the basic tradeoffs faced by a government in the decision to implement an immigration amnesty in the presence of a selective immigration policy. We show that two channels play an important role: an amnesty is more likely the more restricted are the occupational opportunities of undocumented immigrants and the less redistributive is the welfare state. Empirical evidence based on a novel panel dataset of legalizations carried out by a group of OECD countries between 1980-2007 broadly supports the role played by the channels identified in our theoretical model.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 3981

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
International Migration
Geographic Labor Mobility; Immigrant Workers
Thema
illegal immigration
amnesties
labor market mismatch
welfare state
Illegale Einwanderung
Straffreiheit
Migrationspolitik
Arbeitsmarktflexibilität
Sozialstaat
OECD-Staaten

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Casarico, Alessandra
Facchini, Giovanni
Frattini, Tommaso
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2012

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Casarico, Alessandra
  • Facchini, Giovanni
  • Frattini, Tommaso
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2012

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