Arbeitspapier
What drives immigration amnesties?
We develop a general model of legal and illegal immigration to understand the basic tradeoffs faced by a government in the decision to implement an immigration amnesty in the presence of a selective immigration policy. We show that two channels play an important role: an amnesty is more likely the more restricted are the occupational opportunities of undocumented immigrants and the less redistributive is the welfare state. Empirical evidence based on a novel panel dataset of legalizations carried out by a group of OECD countries between 1980-2007 broadly supports the role played by the channels identified in our theoretical model.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 3981
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
International Migration
Geographic Labor Mobility; Immigrant Workers
- Subject
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illegal immigration
amnesties
labor market mismatch
welfare state
Illegale Einwanderung
Straffreiheit
Migrationspolitik
Arbeitsmarktflexibilität
Sozialstaat
OECD-Staaten
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Casarico, Alessandra
Facchini, Giovanni
Frattini, Tommaso
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (where)
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Munich
- (when)
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2012
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
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Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Casarico, Alessandra
- Facchini, Giovanni
- Frattini, Tommaso
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Time of origin
- 2012