Arbeitspapier

What drives immigration amnesties?

We develop a general model of legal and illegal immigration to understand the basic tradeoffs faced by a government in the decision to implement an immigration amnesty in the presence of a selective immigration policy. We show that two channels play an important role: an amnesty is more likely the more restricted are the occupational opportunities of undocumented immigrants and the less redistributive is the welfare state. Empirical evidence based on a novel panel dataset of legalizations carried out by a group of OECD countries between 1980-2007 broadly supports the role played by the channels identified in our theoretical model.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 3981

Classification
Wirtschaft
International Migration
Geographic Labor Mobility; Immigrant Workers
Subject
illegal immigration
amnesties
labor market mismatch
welfare state
Illegale Einwanderung
Straffreiheit
Migrationspolitik
Arbeitsmarktflexibilität
Sozialstaat
OECD-Staaten

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Casarico, Alessandra
Facchini, Giovanni
Frattini, Tommaso
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(where)
Munich
(when)
2012

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Casarico, Alessandra
  • Facchini, Giovanni
  • Frattini, Tommaso
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Time of origin

  • 2012

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