Arbeitspapier

Optimal Taxation and Social Insurance in a Lifetime Perspective

Advances in information technology have improved the administrative feasibility of redistribution based on lifetime earnings recorded at the time of retirement. We study optimal lifetime income taxation and social insurance in an economy in which redistributive taxation and social insurance serve to insure (ex ante) against skill heterogeneity as well as disability risk. Optimal disability benefits rise with previous earnings so that public transfers depend not only on current earnings but also on earnings in the past. Hence, lifetime taxation rather than annual taxation is optimal. The optimal tax-transfer system does not provide full disability insurance. By offering imperfect insurance and structuring disability benefits so as to enable workers to insure against disability by working harder, social insurance is designed to offset the distortionary impact of the redistributive labor income tax on labor supply.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: EPRU Working Paper Series ; No. 2006-01

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Taxation and Subsidies: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
Social Security and Public Pensions
Thema
optimal lifetime income taxation
optimal social insurance
Einkommensteuer
Optimale Besteuerung
Sozialversicherung
Erwerbsunfähigkeit
Ökonometrisches Modell

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Bovenberg, A. Lans
Birch Sørensen, Peter
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
University of Copenhagen, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU)
(wo)
Copenhagen
(wann)
2006

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:25 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Bovenberg, A. Lans
  • Birch Sørensen, Peter
  • University of Copenhagen, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU)

Entstanden

  • 2006

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