Arbeitspapier
Assessing EU Merger Control through Compensating Efficiencies
Worldwide, the overwhelming majority of large horizontal mergers are cleared by antitrust authorities unconditionally. The presumption seems to be that efficiencies from these mergers are sizeable. We calculate the compensating efficiencies that would prevent a merger from harming consumers for 1,014 mergers affecting 12,325 antitrust markets scrutinized by the European Commission between 1990 and 2018. Compensating efficiencies seem too large to be achievable for many mergers. Barriers to entry and the number of firms active in the market are the most important factors determining their size. We highlight concerns about the Commission’s merger enforcement being too lax.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 9403
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance: Other
Contracting Out; Joint Ventures; Technology Licensing
Industrial Organization: General
Antitrust Law
- Thema
-
compensating efficiencies
efficiency gains
merger control
concentration
screens
HHI
mergers
unilateral effects
market definition
entry barriers
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Affeldt, Pauline
Duso, Tomaso
Gugler, Klaus
Piechucka, Joanna
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2021
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Affeldt, Pauline
- Duso, Tomaso
- Gugler, Klaus
- Piechucka, Joanna
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2021