Arbeitspapier

Assessing EU Merger Control through Compensating Efficiencies

Worldwide, the overwhelming majority of large horizontal mergers are cleared by antitrust authorities unconditionally. The presumption seems to be that efficiencies from these mergers are sizeable. We calculate the compensating efficiencies that would prevent a merger from harming consumers for 1,014 mergers affecting 12,325 antitrust markets scrutinized by the European Commission between 1990 and 2018. Compensating efficiencies seem too large to be achievable for many mergers. Barriers to entry and the number of firms active in the market are the most important factors determining their size. We highlight concerns about the Commission’s merger enforcement being too lax.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 9403

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance: Other
Contracting Out; Joint Ventures; Technology Licensing
Industrial Organization: General
Antitrust Law
Thema
compensating efficiencies
efficiency gains
merger control
concentration
screens
HHI
mergers
unilateral effects
market definition
entry barriers

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Affeldt, Pauline
Duso, Tomaso
Gugler, Klaus
Piechucka, Joanna
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2021

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Affeldt, Pauline
  • Duso, Tomaso
  • Gugler, Klaus
  • Piechucka, Joanna
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2021

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