Arbeitspapier
Contracts as a barrier to entry in markets with non-pivotal buyers
Considering markets with non-pivotal buyers we analyze the anti-competitive effects of breakup fees used by an incumbent facing a more efficient entrant in the future. Buyers differ in their intrinsic switching costs. Breakup fees are profitably used to foreclose entry, regardless of the entrant's efficiency advantage or level of switching costs. Banning breakup fees is beneficial to consumers and enhances the total welfare unless the entrant's efficiency is close to the incumbent's. Inefficient foreclosure arises not because of rent shifting from the entrant, but because the incumbent uses the long-term contract to manipulate consumers' expected surplus from not signing it.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: ESMT Working Paper ; No. 15-02 (R1)
- Klassifikation
-
Management
- Thema
-
Wechselverhalten
Zahlungsbereitschaftsanalyse
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Bedre-Defolie, Özlem
Biglaiser, Gary
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
European School of Management and Technology (ESMT)
- (wo)
-
Berlin
- (wann)
-
2016
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Bedre-Defolie, Özlem
- Biglaiser, Gary
- European School of Management and Technology (ESMT)
Entstanden
- 2016
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