Artikel

Social activity and network formation

This paper develops a simple model in which a social hierarchy emerges endogenously when agents form a network for complementary interaction (``activity''). Specifically, we assume that agents are ex ante identical and their best response activity, as well as their value function, increases (strictly) concavely in the total activity of their neighbours in the network. There exists a unique and stable positive activity equilibrium on exogenous networks under mild conditions. When we endogenise network formation, equilibria become strongly structured: more active players have more neighbours, i.e. a higher degree, but tend to sponsor fewer links. Additionally, in strict equilibria agents separate themselves into groups characterised by the symmetric activity of their members. The characteristic activity decreases in group size and the network is a complete multipartite graph.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Journal: Theoretical Economics ; ISSN: 1555-7561 ; Volume: 10 ; Year: 2015 ; Issue: 2 ; Pages: 315-340 ; New Haven, CT: The Econometric Society

Classification
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Microeconomics: General
Network Formation and Analysis: Theory
Subject
Network formation
strategic complementarity
supermodularity
peer effects
social hierarchy

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Baetz, Oliver
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
The Econometric Society
(where)
New Haven, CT
(when)
2015

DOI
doi:10.3982/TE1487
Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Artikel

Associated

  • Baetz, Oliver
  • The Econometric Society

Time of origin

  • 2015

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