Broken punishment networks in public goods games: Experimental evidence

Arbeitspapier

Abundant evidence suggests that high levels of contributions to public goods can be sustained through self-governed monitoring and sanctions. This experimental study investigates the effectiveness of decentralized sanctioning institutions where punishment opportunities are restricted to agents who are linked through alternative punishment networks. We find that the structure of the punishment network significantly impacts contributions to the public good, but not overall efficiencies. Contributions collapse over decision rounds in groups with limited punishment opportunities, even if the absolute punishment capacity corresponds to the complete punishment network where all agents are allowed to punish each other. However, after allowing for the costs of sanctions, efficiencies are similar across the different networks that allow for punishment and the no-punishment network.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Jena Economic Research Papers ; No. 2012,004

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior ; Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles ; Public Goods
• Subject: public goods ; experiment ; punishment ; cooperation ; networks ; Öffentliches Gut ; Nichtkooperatives Spiel ; Trittbrettfahrerverhalten ; Strafe ; Soziales Netzwerk ; Test

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Leibbrandt, Andreas ; Ramalingam, Abhijit ; Sääksvuori, Lauri ; Walker, James M.
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics
• (where): Jena
• (when): 2012

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/56872
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET