Arbeitspapier

Broken punishment networks in public goods games: Experimental evidence

Abundant evidence suggests that high levels of contributions to public goods can be sustained through self-governed monitoring and sanctions. This experimental study investigates the effectiveness of decentralized sanctioning institutions where punishment opportunities are restricted to agents who are linked through alternative punishment networks. We find that the structure of the punishment network significantly impacts contributions to the public good, but not overall efficiencies. Contributions collapse over decision rounds in groups with limited punishment opportunities, even if the absolute punishment capacity corresponds to the complete punishment network where all agents are allowed to punish each other. However, after allowing for the costs of sanctions, efficiencies are similar across the different networks that allow for punishment and the no-punishment network.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Jena Economic Research Papers ; No. 2012,004

Classification
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
Public Goods
Subject
public goods
experiment
punishment
cooperation
networks
Öffentliches Gut
Nichtkooperatives Spiel
Trittbrettfahrerverhalten
Strafe
Soziales Netzwerk
Test

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Leibbrandt, Andreas
Ramalingam, Abhijit
Sääksvuori, Lauri
Walker, James M.
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics
(where)
Jena
(when)
2012

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Leibbrandt, Andreas
  • Ramalingam, Abhijit
  • Sääksvuori, Lauri
  • Walker, James M.
  • Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics

Time of origin

  • 2012

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