Arbeitspapier

A comparison of punishment rules in repeated public good games: An experimental study

In this experimental study we analyse three collective and one individual punishment rule in a public good setting. We show that under all punishment rules cooperation is stronger and more sustainable than reported from settings without punishment. Moreover, we present evidence and explanations for differences between the rules concerning punishment intensity, contribution and profit levels, as well as justice. Finally, we investigate influences crucial to participants' support for a collective rule when the individual rule is the status quo. We show that beside profit differences the degree of consent required by the collective rule is essential for the degree of support by the participants.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: SFB 373 Discussion Paper ; No. 2002,71

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Public Goods
Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Thema
cooperation
experiment
public good
free-riding
punishment institution

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Decker, Torsten
Stiehler, Andreas
Strobel, Martin
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes
(wo)
Berlin
(wann)
2002

Handle
URN
urn:nbn:de:kobv:11-10049365
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Decker, Torsten
  • Stiehler, Andreas
  • Strobel, Martin
  • Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes

Entstanden

  • 2002

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