A comparison of punishment rules in repeated public good games: An experimental study

Arbeitspapier

In this experimental study we analyse three collective and one individual punishment rule in a public good setting. We show that under all punishment rules cooperation is stronger and more sustainable than reported from settings without punishment. Moreover, we present evidence and explanations for differences between the rules concerning punishment intensity, contribution and profit levels, as well as justice. Finally, we investigate influences crucial to participants' support for a collective rule when the individual rule is the status quo. We show that beside profit differences the degree of consent required by the collective rule is essential for the degree of support by the participants.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: SFB 373 Discussion Paper ; No. 2002,71

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Public Goods ; Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
• Thema: cooperation ; experiment ; public good ; free-riding ; punishment institution

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Decker, Torsten ; Stiehler, Andreas ; Strobel, Martin
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes
• (wo): Berlin
• (wann): 2002

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/65305
• URN: urn:nbn:de:kobv:11-10049365
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ