Arbeitspapier
Signalling rivalry and quality uncertainty in a duopoly
This paper considers a market in which only the incumbent's quality is publicly known. The entrant's quality is observed by the incumbent and some fraction of informed consumers. This leads to price signalling rivalry between the duopolists, because the incumbent gains and the entrant loses when observed prices make the uninformed consumers more pessimistic about the entrant's quality. When the uninformed consumers' beliefs satisfy the intuitive criterion and the unprejudiced belief refinement, only a two-sided separating equilibrium can exist and prices are identical to the full information outcome.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Diskussionsbeiträge ; No. 2011/20
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Information and Product Quality; Standardization and Compatibility
- Thema
-
quality uncertainty
signalling
oligopoly
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Bester, Helmut
Demuth, Juri
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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Freie Universität Berlin, Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaft
- (wo)
-
Berlin
- (wann)
-
2011
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Bester, Helmut
- Demuth, Juri
- Freie Universität Berlin, Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaft
Entstanden
- 2011