Artikel

Minimum quality standards and benchmarking in differentiated duopoly

We study a two-period model of a duopoly with goods differentiated by quality. The periods’ length corresponds to the goods’ useful lifespan, and consumers are heterogeneous in their valuation of quality. In the second period, the regulator fixes a minimum quality standard based either on the quality supplied by the high-quality firm in the first period (strict regulation) or on the average quality supplied in the first period (average regulation). Assuming a covered market, we show that such an approach leads to decreasing qualities in the first period, and increasing qualities in the second one. In both periods, net utility aggregated over consumers is increasing and profits aggregated over firms are decreasing. Taken together, average regulation always leads to an increase in the present value of welfare, whereas strict regulation can cause a decline. If the discount factor exceeds a certain threshold, a policy based on average regulation is even superior to implementing the optimal minimum quality standard already in the first period.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Journal: The Japanese Economic Review ; ISSN: 1468-5876 ; Volume: 73 ; Year: 2020 ; Issue: 3 ; Pages: 515-537 ; Singapore: Springer Nature

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Health: Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
Information and Product Quality; Standardization and Compatibility
Noncooperative Games
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Health: Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
Information and Product Quality; Standardization and Compatibility

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Michaelis, Peter
Ziesemer, Thomas
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Springer Nature
(wo)
Singapore
(wann)
2020

DOI
doi:10.1007/s42973-020-00050-y
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Artikel

Beteiligte

  • Michaelis, Peter
  • Ziesemer, Thomas
  • Springer Nature

Entstanden

  • 2020

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