The Effect of Incentives in Non-Routine Analytical Team Tasks - Evidence from a Field Experiment

Arbeitspapier

Despite the prevalence of non-routine analytical team tasks in modern economies, little is known about how incentives influence performance in these tasks. In a field experiment with more than 3000 participants, we document a positive effect of bonus incentives on the probability of completion of such a task. Bonus incentives increase performance due to the reward rather than the reference point (performance threshold) they provide. The framing of bonuses (as gains or losses) plays a minor role. Incentives improve performance also in an additional sample of presumably less motivated workers. However, incentives reduce these workers’ willingness to “explore” original solutions.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 6903

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior ; Field Experiments ; Compensation Packages; Payment Methods ; Personnel Economics: Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
• Subject: team work ; bonus ; incentives ; loss ; gain ; non-routine ; exploration

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Englmaier, Florian ; Grimm, Stefan ; Schindler, David ; Schudy, Simeon Andreas Dermot
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (where): Munich
• (when): 2018

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/176922
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:46 AM CET