Arbeitspapier
The Effect of Incentives in Non-Routine Analytical Team Tasks - Evidence From a Field Experiment
Despite the prevalence of non-routine analytical team tasks in modern economies, little is known about how incentives influence performance in these tasks. In a field experiment with more than 3000 participants, we document a positive effect of bonus incentives on the probability of completion of such a task. Bonus incentives increase performance due to the reward rather than the reference point (performance threshold) they provide. The framing of bonuses (as gains or losses) plays a minor role. Incentives improve performance also in an additional sample of presumably less motivated workers. However, incentives reduce these workers\' willingness to \"explore\" original solutions.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 71
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Field Experiments
Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
Personnel Economics: Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
- Thema
-
team work
bonus
incentives
loss
gain
non-routine
exploration
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Englmaier, Florian
Grimm, Stefan
Schindler, David
Schudy, Simeon
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München und Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190 - Rationality and Competition
- (wo)
-
München und Berlin
- (wann)
-
2018
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Englmaier, Florian
- Grimm, Stefan
- Schindler, David
- Schudy, Simeon
- Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München und Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190 - Rationality and Competition
Entstanden
- 2018