Arbeitspapier

A Minimal Test for Convex Games and the Shapley Value

A set of necessary and sufficient conditions for convexity of a transferable utility game in terms of its decomposition into unanimity games is shown to be minimal: none of the conditions is redundant. The result is used to provide an axiomatization of the Shapley value on the set of convex games.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Working Paper ; No. 2001:2

Classification
Wirtschaft
Cooperative Games
Subject
Convex game
unanimity game
Shapley value
axiomatization
Spieltheorie
Theorie
Shapley-Wert

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Voorneveld, Mark
Grahn, Sofia
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Uppsala University, Department of Economics
(where)
Uppsala
(when)
2001

Handle
URN
urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-2512
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Voorneveld, Mark
  • Grahn, Sofia
  • Uppsala University, Department of Economics

Time of origin

  • 2001

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