Arbeitspapier
A Minimal Test for Convex Games and the Shapley Value
A set of necessary and sufficient conditions for convexity of a transferable utility game in terms of its decomposition into unanimity games is shown to be minimal: none of the conditions is redundant. The result is used to provide an axiomatization of the Shapley value on the set of convex games.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: Working Paper ; No. 2001:2
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Cooperative Games
- Subject
-
Convex game
unanimity game
Shapley value
axiomatization
Spieltheorie
Theorie
Shapley-Wert
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Voorneveld, Mark
Grahn, Sofia
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Uppsala University, Department of Economics
- (where)
-
Uppsala
- (when)
-
2001
- Handle
- URN
-
urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-2512
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
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Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Voorneveld, Mark
- Grahn, Sofia
- Uppsala University, Department of Economics
Time of origin
- 2001