Improving Incentives in Unemployment Insurance: A Review of Recent Research

Arbeitspapier

This paper provides a review of the recent literature on how incentives in unemployment insurance (UI) can be improved. We are particularly concerned with three instruments, viz. the duration of benefit payments (or more generally the time sequencing of benefits), monitoring in conjunction with sanctions, and workfare. Our reading of the theoretical literature is that the case for imposing a penalty on less active job search is fairly solid. A growing number of empirical studies, including randomized experiments, are in line with this conclusion.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Working Paper ; No. 2003:10

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search ; Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings ; Mobility, Unemployment, and Vacancies: Public Policy
• Thema: Unemployment insurance ; search ; monitoring ; sactions ; workfare ; Arbeitslosenversicherung ; Arbeitsuche ; Ökonomischer Anreiz ; Theorie

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Fredriksson, Peter ; Holmlund, Bertil
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Uppsala University, Department of Economics
• (wo): Uppsala
• (wann): 2003

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/82735
• URN: urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-4464
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ