Arbeitspapier

Banking Panics and the Lender of Last Resort in a Monetary Economy

This paper studies the role of a lender of last resort (LLR) in a monetary model where a shortage of bank’s monetary reserves (or a banking panic) occurs endogenously. We show that while a discount window policy introduced by the LLR is welfare improving, it reduces the banks’ ex ante incentive to hold reserves, which increases the probability of a panic, and causes moral hazard in asset investments. We also examine the combined effect of other related policies such as a penalty in lending rate, liquidity requirements and constructive ambiguity.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 7451

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Money and Interest Rates: General
Thema
monetary equilibrium
banking panic
moral hazard
lender of last resort

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Matsuoka, Tarishi
Watanabe, Makoto
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2019

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Matsuoka, Tarishi
  • Watanabe, Makoto
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2019

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