Signaling without common prior: An experiment

Arbeitspapier

The common prior assumption is pervasive in game-theoretic models with incomplete information. This paper investigates experimentally the importance of inducing a common prior in a two-person signaling game. For a specific probability distribution of the sender's type, the long-run behavior without an induced common prior is shown to be different from the behavior when a common prior is induced, while for other distributions behavior is similar under both regimes. We also present a learning model that allows players to learn about the other players' strategies and the prior distribution of the sender's type. We show that this learning model accurately accounts for all main features of the data.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: CeDEx Discussion Paper Series ; No. 2009-08

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Noncooperative Games ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior ; Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
• Subject: common prior ; signaling ; experiment ; learning ; Signalling ; Nichtkooperatives Spiel ; Statistische Verteilung ; Lernen ; Test ; Theorie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Drouvelis, Michalis ; Müller, Wieland ; Possajennikov, Alex
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): The University of Nottingham, Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics (CeDEx)
• (where): Nottingham
• (when): 2009

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/49676
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET